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 August 18, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE

payers conservatively \$250 million then as best we can figure.

Now, that sounds astounding—but it did happen in the context of the atmosphere of that time.

What I am saying is—I just wonder if we are fully charged with knowledge in order to give our imprimatur to an agreement that is far reaching insofar as the national security is concerned.

Mr. HOLFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I want to place on the record my position on this bill.

This is probably one of the most important documents that has faced this Congress, at least in my 30 years of experience here. Anyone can find something to criticize about anything. I can find some things in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that are not exactly to my liking. But I think this is a step away from chaos and from the possible total destruction of mankind.

As the former chairman and vice chairman, and as a member for 26 years, of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I think I know a little something about what I am speaking.

I have watched the growth of the capability to wage nuclear destruction, both of our country on other countries, and of other countries on our country over the years, with great concern and apprehension in my mind.

I have sustained a strong capability on the part of this country, and I will sustain that as long as I am a Member of this House, because I confidently believe that in so sustaining that capability I was and am sustaining the power of deterrence which would keep the other fellow from making a mistake.

I also thought it was the only way we could guarantee peace in this world during this dangerous period, when the people of the world were beginning to find out what the total destructive capability of nuclear weapons could be.

As far back as 1959, I started hearings on the effects of atomic warfare. You can find it in several bound volumes, each 3 inches thick. We of the Joint Committee brought out for the first time a study by the experts of the Defense Department, as to what the exact capability of destruction was at that time. That was in 1959.

It said that a mild attack, a very reasonably mild attack upon the United States would destroy 60 million lives. Today each nation has many, many times the number and megaton warheads we had then.

One of my purposes in bringing these facts out was that I wanted the people of the United States to know, and I wanted the people of the world to know, the destructive capability of nuclear weapons. That knowledge has grown now to the point where I believe there is a new wind blowing in the world. I am not naive about the Soviet purposes—about their philosophy—about their dedication some day to be the controller of the world. But I am also not naive about the fact that they know if they start a nuclear war, it will start the destruction of the Soviet Union as well as of Western Europe and the United States.

So I say that for the first time in the history of mankind, there is the most compelling motive in the hearts and minds of man—of every nation—to have a more peaceful world than has ever existed before.

That compelling motive is based on self interest—on the will to survive of the individual, which is the strongest instinct in mankind. When that will to survive permeates the intelligence of the leaders of nations of the world—that they too will perish in a nuclear war for that there is no place for the leaders to hide. In the event of a nuclear war radiation from nuclear weapons will permeate this Chamber and every other building in the United States. It would kill the people sitting in this Chamber, if it should occur—even though we were not in the blast area. This is the reason that there is growing throughout the world a compelling instinct to survive. It is causing the leaders of nations to make up their minds that no longer can we risk nuclear war. We cannot endure a full-scale nuclear war. Military capability to destroy is no longer partial, it is total.

Military capability to defend against full-scale nuclear attack is negligible. It is no longer credible. This applies to all clear weapon powers as well as ourselves.

This situation has never existed before in the annals of recorded history.

This wind that is the wind that is blowing in the minds of men throughout the world—and it is blowing in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union the same as it is in our minds. This is why I must pin my faith in some kind of agreement, not a perfect agreement, but an agreement that, in my opinion, is a step, is an important step, toward recognition of this one fact: That if mankind is to survive, mankind cannot afford a nuclear war. We cannot afford to start one; they cannot afford to start one. We cannot afford to retaliate; they cannot afford to retaliate. The price is too great to pay. This is the first real major power recognition of these principles that I am talking about. It is not perfect, but it is a building stone upon which we can build an edifice of peace.

I believe we should all get behind this and take this step forward.

I wish to pay my tribute to the President of the United States for his work in this field. It is far more important than this coming election; I will tell you that. It is of importance to you and your wife and your children and your children's children, and it may be the first important step for the preservation of the human race.

What more can I say?

What more can any man say?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, let us take a closer look at the statement of Senator SMITH which appears in her article, "It's Time To Speak Up for National Defense," from the March 1972, issue of Reader's Digest. She stated:

We may well have lost one of the crucial battles of the cold war when we entered into the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviets. I was one of 19 in the Senate who voted against the treaty. Now, after nearly nine years of reflection, my only regret is that the American people still have not been told the whole story about how the treaty worked to the Russians' tremendous advantage and to our own vast detriment.

Senators who voted against the treaty were not popular, but we who did so acted on the basis of information that was—wrongly, I still believe—classified secret and given to us behind closed doors. . . ." (Italic added.)

Note that Senator SMITH believes that the American people should have been given information which was classified secret and which was withheld from them during the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Furthermore, she states that this information should today be made available to the public.

Now let us consider the interim agreement which we are debating today. House Report 92-1324 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs states that the Interim agreement is so closely linked with the treaty limiting anti-ballistic-missile systems that "an understanding of both is essential." The report states:

The SALT accords consist of (1) a treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems and (2) a five-year interim agreement which freezes the overall levels of strategic offensive missile forces pending further negotiations which are to begin in October. There is also a protocol to the interim agreement, and a number of statements of "interpretation," some agreed and some unilateral. The texts may be found in House Document 92-311.

As is customary, the treaty was sent to the Senate for its "advice and consent," while the interim agreement on offensive strategic arms has been submitted to both Houses for approval. Although the House of Representatives is being called upon to pass on only the interim agreement, the two accords are so closely linked that an understanding of both is essential.

Remembering Senator SMITH's objection to the element of secrecy surrounding the information withheld in 1963, consider the statement of Dr. Edward Teller, the eminent nuclear weapons authority, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the subject of the SALT Accords just a few days ago on August 9:

The agreement on rocket deployment contains an Article VI which is similar to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. In this case, as well as in the ABM Treaty, it is important to pay attention to the national means of verification which is supposed to furnish *prima facie* (Teller's emphasis) evidence of compliance. These means of verification are secret. It is disturbing that on this vital point the public cannot get detailed information. In fact, even the information available to Congress is less than complete. One should raise the question whether these national means of verification should be declassified. (Italic added.)

Dr. Teller's objection to secrecy is reminiscent of Senator SMITH's experience in 1963 although Dr. Teller goes a step further and claims that the information available to Congress was less than complete. As with Senator SMITH, he maintains that certain secret information should at the present time be declassified. It is interesting to note that information on the national means of

H 7946

August 18, 1972

permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, today the House will have its opportunity to express its support of the interim agreement on offensive arms which was concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union and signed by the President in Moscow last May.

This agreement is one of two accords to have been reached as a result of the strategic arms limitation talks—better known as SALT—which began in November 1969.

The other agreement limits the deployment of defensive missile systems. Since it is to be a permanent—rather than interim—agreement, it was submitted to the Senate as a treaty.

The Senate on August 3 gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 88 to 2.

The interim agreement on offensive arms was submitted to both Houses by the President. He has asked for an expression of support from the Congress through passage of a joint resolution.

This action by the President is in accord with section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act which requires that all arms control agreements entered into by the United States must be approved by Congress either by treaty or authorization through further affirmative legislation.

After several weeks of hearings on the subject, the committee by a vote of 23 to 1 voted to report the amended resolution which is before us today—House Joint Resolution 1227.

The committee approval of this very important arms limitation agreement was not a decision lightly taken.

A subcommittee of the committee had followed the progress of the talks for almost 3 years. During that period it was briefed by U.S. SALT negotiators nine times.

Other briefings on SALT-related subjects were held with officials of the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency during that period.

We were informed and consulted virtually every step of the way on these agreements.

In addition, once the SALT accords had been signed and the interim agreement had been submitted to us for approval, the committee took testimony from high-ranking executive branch officials, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and our chief negotiators at SALT—Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

As a result of our deliberations, the committee was convinced that the SALT accords are a significant step toward arms limitation fully consistent with the national security interests of the United States.

#### SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS

At this point let me summarize the major provisions of the documents as signed.

Although the ABM treaty is not before this body today for approval, it is so

closely related to the interim agreement on offensive arms that the latter cannot be understood completely with some understanding of the treaty.

The ABM treaty allows each side to have one ABM site for the defense of its capital and another site for defense of intercontinental ballistic missiles—ICBM's.

The two sites must be at least 800 miles apart in order to prevent the development of a territorial defense. Each ABM site can have 100 missiles, for a total of 200 for each side.

The treaty contains additional provisions which prohibit either the establishment of a radar base for the defense of populated areas or the capability to intercept ballistic missiles by conversion of air defense missiles to antiballistic missiles.

The treaty also bans sea-based, space-based or land-mobile ABM systems.

Each party will use its own national technical means of verification—such as observation satellites—to monitor compliance with the accords. There is no on-site inspection involved.

A standing consultative commission will be established to promote implementation of the agreements and handle questions which arise in their implementation—including questions of compliance.

The treaty provides for withdrawal by either party on 6 month's notice if "supreme national interests" are judged to have been jeopardized by developments.

The interim agreement on offensive arms is to run for 5 years, unless replaced earlier by a comprehensive permanent agreement. Negotiations on a permanent agreement are to begin in October.

The interim agreement essentially freezes the numbers of strategic offensive missiles on both sides at approximately the levels currently operational or under construction.

For ICBM's, the number is 1,054 for the United States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. Within this overall limitation, the Soviet Union has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers at the current level of those in operation or under construction—a total of 313.

There is a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles, including a ban on any significant enlargement of missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more complicated.

Briefly, the Soviets are frozen to their claimed current level, operational and under construction, or about 740 submarine-launched missiles—some of them on an older type nuclear sub.

They are permitted to build to a ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles but only if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine-launched missiles to offset the new construction. This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and some 30 missiles on about nine older nuclear submarines.

The United States, by exercising similar options, could increase its SLBM launchers from 656 to 710, and its modern nuclear submarines from 41 to 44.

The agreement does not affect bombers and other aircraft. Nor does it affect

our forward-based systems in Europe or the strategic weapons of our NATO allies.

In sum, the interim offensive agreement will keep the overall number of strategic ballistic missile launchers both on land and sea within an agreed ceiling. That ceiling essentially is the current level of weapons, operational or under construction.

The agreement will stop the momentum of the Soviet strategic arms buildup and prevent any further increase in the numerical gap in missile launchers between the United States and Russia.

At the same time it will not affect any on-going American programs.

For example, it will not prevent the continuation of the U.S. program to convert its ICBM's and SLBM's to multiple warheads.

Nor is the B-1 bomber or the Trident submarine system within the purview of the freeze.

#### THE INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS

In addition to the agreements themselves, there were a number of interpretive statements. Those interpretations have been provided to the Congress, along with the agreements.

The interpretations are in several forms:

Agreed statements initiated by the delegations;

Agreed interpretations or common understandings which were not set down formally and initialed; and

Unilateral interpretations to make our position clear in instances where it was not possible to get agreement.

The most important of these unilateral statements by the United States involve—

The right of the United States to withdraw from the ABM treaty if an agreement for a more complete strategic offensive arms pact is not achieved within 5 years;

The definition of a "heavy" ICBM from the viewpoint of the United States; and

The inconsistency with the objectives of the interim agreement which would be involved in any deployment of land-mobile ICBM launchers by the Soviet Union.

Dr. Henry Kissinger pointed out during his briefing to Members of Congress on the SALT agreements that in any negotiation of such complexity there will inevitably be details upon which the parties cannot agree. The United States made certain unilateral statements in order to insure that its position on those details was included in the negotiating record and understood by the Russians.

The committee believed that the several matters covered in the unilateral declarations by the United States are important enough to warrant special attention from the Congress.

Consequently, in the report on this resolution, it expressed the viewpoint that actions inconsistent with U.S. interpretations would be considered grave matters affecting the national security interests of the United States.

Our objective was to express congressional support for our SALT negotiators on those important points.